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Symposium
Introduction: Property Rules as Remedies
Emily Sherwin t
Twenty-five years ago Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed proposed
that we might look at legal rights and duties in a new way. ' Their insight was
that in the process of assigning rights and duties, two distinct decisions must
be made. First, who should hold the entitlement? That is, whose interest should
be supported by law when interests conflict? Second, how should the
entitlement be protected? The entitlement might be backed by a property rule,
which promises state intervention to prevent involuntary transfers from the
holder of the entitlement to others. Alternatively, it might be backed only by
a liability rule, which requires those who would take or violate the entitlement
to pay a price set by the state.
The choice between property rules and liability rules has important
consequences for the process by which entitlements change hands. When an
entitlement is protected by a property rule, it can only be acquired with the
holder's consent, at the price he demands. When it is protected by a liability
rule, it can be taken without consent, at the price fixed by the state.2
Occasionally the state may choose instead to prohibit both voluntary and
involuntary transfers-to make the entitlement inalienable.'
After presenting this picture of legal rights and duties, Calabresi and
Melamed outlined possible reasons for choosing one method of protecting
entitlements over another. Central among these was the observation that while
property rules promote an efficient process of exchange when transaction costs
are low, liability rules are more likely to promote efficient exchanges when the
'I Professor of Law, University of San Diego. Thanks to Larry Alexander. Kevin Cole. Cynthia Lee,
Mike Rappaport, Maimon Schwarzschild, Edmund Ursin. Paul Wohlmuth, and Chns Wonnell for helpful
comments.
1. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed. Property Rules. Liabdity Rules. and lnaienabthty:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
2. See id. at 1092.
3. See id. at 1092-93.
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costs of bargaining are prohibitively high.4 This thought and the analytical
framework on which it rests immediately caught the interest of the legal
academy and have held it ever since.'
The essays collected here honor the twenty-fifth anniversary of Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral and
continue the discussion this great article has generated. Richard Epstein makes
the case for a legal regime in which property rules predominate and liability
rules are reserved for cases of necessity and large-scale holdout problems
subject to appropriate institutional safeguards. James Krier and Stewart Schwab
explore generally, through the use of citation analysis, the continuing
importance of The Cathedral to legal scholarship. Saul Levmore explains how
the framework originally proposed by Calabresi and Melamed has been
expanded to cover a larger range of remedies, including restitutionary
combinations that could be used to force information from litigants. Carol Rose
identifies the "shadow examples" that stand behind The Cathedral and some
of its progeny, and uses these examples to point out differences among the
traditional legal categories of tort, contract, and property.
Because these essays were prepared for a panel on remedies, I would like
to add a comment on the remedial character of property rules and liability
rules. The literature on property rules and liability rules proposes various
criteria for choosing among remedies, but it is largely silent on the form in
which these criteria should be cast.6 In other words, should remedial decisions
be governed by determinate rules or indeterminate standards? 7 In this
4. See id. at 1106-07. Calabresi and Melamed also discuss possible distributive advantages of liability
rules. See id. at 1110.
5. Notable examples of the academy's continued interest in the property/liability rule distinction
include A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 15-25 (1989); lan Ayres
& Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasian Trade, 104 YALEI
L.J. 1027, 1036-72 (1995); Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95
YALE L.J. 1335 (1986); Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and
Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1993); Louis Kaplow & Steven ShavelU, Property Rules Versus
Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARv. L. REV. 713 (1996); James E. Krier & Stewart J.
Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440
(1995); Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and Enforcement Rules: A Better View of the Cathedral (1996)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Other theorists have also explored the implications of
inalienable rights. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV, L. REV. 1849 (1987);
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985).
6. Ian Ayres and Eric Talley have suggested that uncertainty about entitlements and their protection
may promote efficient bargaining. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 5, at 1034-35, 1073-78; see also Jason
Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus Standards, I1 J.L. ECON. & ORO. 256 (1995) (explaining
how "contingent, ex post" entitlement may promote bargaining if ex post balancing by courts is expected
to be imperfect).
7. By "rules," I mean prescriptions that are phrased in determinate language and require a certain
outcome in an identifiable set of cases. The import of a rule is that those to whom it is addressed should
act as prescribed without further consideration of its underlying purposes and ideals. These qualities of
determinacy and generality enable the rule to hold its shape and meaning in a variety of settings over time,
thereby giving prospective definition to legal rights. They differ from open-ended decisional standards,
which invite decisionmakers to engage in normative evaluation of particular facts at the time the standard
is applied. For much fuller analyses of rules and the problem of form, see FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYINO
BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE
2084 [Vol. 106: 2083
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Introduction, I point out that judicial practice strongly favors case-by-case
decisionmaking under loosely defined standards, and I discuss some of the
implications that follow.
In the area of criminal law, statutes identify a determinate core of
entitlements protected by property rules.8 But apart from crime, the great body
of property rules are enforced by courts through equitable remedies such as
injunctions and specific performance-remedies that historically have been
surrounded by a cloud of judicial discretion.9 The first doctrinal hurdle for the
granting of an injunction is the ancient maxim that equitable relief is available
only when damages are inadequate to provide full relief."0 To some extent,
cases in which damages are inadequate can be sorted into categories, but these
have never been reduced to fixed rules and, if anything, the standard of
adequacy has become vaguer and more fact-dependent over time." Further,
even when damages admittedly are inadequate, a collection of notoriously
(1991); Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 U PA L. REV 1191
(1994); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking. 3 J. LEOA. STUD
257 (1974); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis. 42 DUKE LJ 557 (1992).
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication. 89 HARV L RE-V 1685 (1976);
William Powers, Jr., Structural Aspects of the Impact of Law on Moral Duty Within Unlitananism and
Social Contract Theory, 26 UCLA L. REV. 1263 (1979); Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property
Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988).
8. Even here the determinacy of these property rules is tempered somewhat by prosecutonal discretion
in pressing charges and judicial discretion over sentencing, and recent efforts to impose determinate
sentencing rules on courts have met with much judicial resistance. See People v Romero. 917 P2d 628
(Cal. 1996) (interpreting California's "three strikes" law to allow judge to strike prior felony convictions
in furtherance of justice); Josd A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure. N Y L-., Feb 1I.
1992, at 2.
9. See F.W. MArrTLAND, EQUITY 1-11 (2d ed. 1936) (describing history of equity) I JoHN NoRTON
POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 43-67 (5th ed. 1941) (describing moral precepts
in equity jurisprudence); I JOSEPH STORY. COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURtISPRUDENCE § 206 (discussing
role of ethics in equity) (13th ed. 1886). The same can be said of restitutionary remedies, which are
governed by the notoriously indeterminate standard of "unjust enrichment.'" See generally JOHN P
DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT (1951) (discussing history and nature of restitution)
10. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 166 (2d ed. 1993)
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 938 (1965) (noting "relative adequacy" of legal and
equitable remedies). For a thorough analysis of the history and current status of the requirement that
damages be inadequate and the corresponding requirement of irreparable injury. see Dot.4ot.As LAycocK.
THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 1-24 (1991)
There are some interesting parallels between these traditional limits on equitable remedies and the
criteria for remedial choice identified in the literature on property rules and liability rules Decisions holding
that damages are inadequate often turn on the presence of personal, idiosyncratic values that are not
reflected in market price or on the uncertainty of values over an extended period of time, both of which
are likely to drive up errors and other costs of assessing the plaintiff's loss. See Eastern Rolling Mill Co
v. Michlovitz, 145 A. 378, 384 (Md. 1929) (requiring specific performance in contract dispute where
estimated value of future delivery of goods "would be speculative and conjectural. and not, therefore,
compensatory"); Kitchen v. Herring, 42 N.C. (7 Ired. Eq.) 190, 192 (1851) (requinng specific performance
in contract dispute over land); cf. POLINSKY, supra note 5. at 22-24 (discussing importance of accuracy
in measuring damages); Krier & Schwab, supra note 5. at 453-64 (arguing that assumed efficiency o1
liability rules when transaction costs are high may be undercut by high judicial "assessment costs") Judicial
doctrine regarding the adequacy of damage remedies can be understood as reflecting a similar concern with
assessment costs. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 724-37, 759-64 (arguing that as long as courts
can estimate average harm within class of cases, even inaccurate liability rules are superior to property
rules, but conceding that liability rules may lose their advantage if judicial estimates of harm are
systematically low).
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indeterminate equitable defenses may stand in the way of an injunction. An
equitable remedy will be denied, for example, if the plaintiff has come to court
with "unclean hands,"' 2 or if it would impose a hardship on the defendant
that is "disproportionate" to the benefit it confers on the plaintiff.'3 "Unclean
hands" describes an indefinite class of shady conduct, while "disproportionate
hardship" can only be identified by comparing the positions of particular
individuals. Thus, in the most common cases, judicial decisions about whether
to employ a property rule or a liability rule are not governed by fixed rules but
left for case-by-case resolution under indistinct, and inevitably normative,
standards.
The absence of rules for judicial choice among remedies means that
property rules and liability rules, as imposed by courts, have only a limited
prospective role in law. Because the identity of the remedy is uncertain until
a dispute has been adjudicated, property rules and liability rules cannot serve
as incentives before that time. Parties may make prelitigation decisions based
on a probabilistic assessment of the outcome of litigation, 4 but in the absence
of fairly determinate rules dictating the choice of remedy in classes of cases,
a court's eventual selection of a property rule or a liability rule will have little
effect on a potential defendant's decision whether to bargain or to take without
consent. Another way to put this is that property rules and liability rules, as
currently administered by judges, do not operate as conduct rules. Their effect
is limited to secondary decisionmakers (judges) and not to primary actors who
order their conduct in the shadow of legal sanctions.' 5 Moreover, the
existence of an array of possible remedies can change the character of the
12. See, e.g., Carmen v. Fox Film Corp., 269 F. 928, 931 (2d Cir. 1920) (denying injunctive relief due
to unclean hands); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 940 (1965). See generally ZECHARIAH CHIAVEE,
JR., SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 1-22 (1950); DOBBS, supra note 10, at 68.
13. See, e.g., Van Wagner Adver. Co. v. S&M Enter., 492 N.E.2d 756 (N.Y. 1986) (denying specific
performance due to disproportionate hardship); Patel v. All, [1984] 1 All E.R. 978 (Ch. 1984) (denying
specific performance because of harm it would cause defendant); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 941
(1965). See generally DOBBS, supra note 10, at 78-81 (discussing "balance of equities"). Equitable defenses
based on "disproportionate hardship" and plaintiff's "unclean hands" also can be assimilated to some of
the arguments that have appeared in favor of liability rules. Both of these defenses involve situations In
which the costs of bargaining are likely to be high, either because the parties' valuations are very far apart
(disproportionate hardship) or because negotiations are tainted by an acute disparity in information between
parties (unclean hands). This makes liability rules, with prices fixed by the court, an attractive alternative
to bargaining. For the traditional view that liability rules are superior when transaction costs are high, see
POLINSKY, supra note 5, at 19; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 54-57 (3d ed. 1986);
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1106-07; and Craswell, supra note 5, at 8-9. Further, Ian Ayres
and Eric Talley have argued that liability rules will induce parties to bargain to efficient outcomes, because
their effect is to split the entitlement between parties. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between
Consensual and Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235, 237-38 (1996). This
consideration is especially important when the parties must divide a large surplus, or, in the terminology
of traditional doctrine, when the burden of an injunction is disproportionate to its benefit to the plaintiff.
14. Uncertainty about the outcome in fact may have beneficial effects on negotiations between them.
See supra note 6.
15. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal
Law, 97 HARv. L. REv. 625, 625-34 (1984) (discussing distinction between "conduct rules" and "decision
rules").
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underlying entitlement itself. However determinate the initial definition of the
entitlement, its ultimate consequences are uncertain. 6
There are several possible explanations for the courts' apparent distaste for
rules in the area of remedies. The first is that they doubt that rules governing
the choice of remedy can be justified. Because rules by definition are general
and determinate, they inevitably will miss some cases that fall within their
purposes and sweep in some cases that do not. The use of rules may
nevertheless be justified if it appears that decisionmakers will reach a better
sum of results (judged by the purpose of the rule) by following the rule than
they would reach if they exercised their best unconstrained judgment in each
case. 17 This is most likely to be true when the rulemaking authority has better
information than those to whom the rule is addressed,' 8 or when the rule is
necessary to address coordination problems. 9
In designing rules for choice among remedies, however, a judge has no
informational advantage overjudges in future cases. If anything, the situational
bias of adjudication puts the judge at a disadvantage in assessing the future
consequences of the rule.20 With respect to coordination, rules for choosing
among remedies might well be beneficial-in fact, any argument about the
prelitigation incentive effects of property rules or liability rules assumes that
this is so. But the longstanding preference of courts for indistinct standards of
hardship and unfairness suggests that they have not looked at remedial
decisions this way. Their instinct appears to have been that the benefits of
coordination are low in comparison with the benefits of careful tailoring, case
by case.
Another possible explanation for judges' reluctance to announce rules for
the choice of remedies is that they believe remedial discretion is necessary to
the perceived legitimacy of the legal system. Members of the public are most
likely to have confidence in the legal system if they can perceive its
16. Cf Coleman & Kraus, supra note 5, at 1342 (charactenzing entitlements as "conceptual markers."
"content" of which is supplied by property rules and liability rules): Madeline Morms. The Structure of
Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REv. 822, 842-44 (1993) (questioning distinction between entitlements and
their enforcement).
17. Joseph Raz has termed this the "normal justification" of political authonty See JosEPil RAZ, THE
MORALn'Y OF FREEDOM 70-80 (1986).
18. See SCHAUER, supra note 7, at 150-55, 163-66 (exploring ways in which rules reduce errors).
Heidi M. Hurd, Challenging Authority, 100 YALE L.J. 1611, 1615 (1991) (discussing "-theoretical authonty*"
of those in "position to give good advice concerning how another ought to act in certain circumstances").
19. See, e.g., Gerald J. Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law. IlJ LErAL
STUD. 165 (1982).
20. Suppose, for example, that a judge is considering whether to order a defendant to remove a two-
story wooden building that encroaches on a parcel of land, and suppose also that the sole objecttve in such
cases is efficiency. Because this judge, like all judges, sees the problem through the filter of a particular
case--how this building came to encroach on this land--there is no reason to think he has better
information about the efficiency of injunctions in a class of future cases than the judges who eventually
will preside over those cases. Therefore, he may limit his thoughts about efficiency to the facts before him.
rather than announcing a rule that injunctions should always be granted against encroachments less than
three stories high, or against encroachments made of wood
1997] 2087
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importance to their own lives, and they are most likely to observe the effects
of law at the remedial stage, when general laws are applied to specific facts.
People do not respond to abstract propositions about the benefits of rules in the
same way that they respond to tangible, specific, and proximate outcomes.
Thus, when a fully justified rule yields an obviously bad result, they will be
unsatisfied if the court refuses to soften the application of the rule.
As a result, it may be wise for courts to choose remedies case by case,
even when a fixed rule of entitlement would produce a better sum of results
over time. Of course, public faith in law will also suffer if there are large
discrepancies between ex ante rules of entitlement and their remedial
consequences. But at least when rights and remedies are thought of as distinct
elements of law, the variety of judicial remedies available to enforce rights can
serve as a safety valve, allowing courts to engage in retrospective fine-tuning
of rules without appearing to alter them.2
I do not mean to endorse current remedial practice, but only to suggest
some explanations for it. The two possibilities I have suggested are the absence
of a "normal justification" for remedial rules and the psychological importance
of tailoring remedies to specific cases. It may turn out on closer inspection that
neither is persuasive and that the courts would do better by fashioning rules
for the choice among remedies. Particularly if coordination of conduct in
advance of (or outside) litigation is of primary importance, criteria for efficient
remedial choice should be recast in a determinate form that will allow property
rules and liability rules to operate prospectively. If, on the other hand, it
appears that courts have been acting on sound intuition, either about the greater
accuracy of case-by-case decisionmaking or about the systemic importance of
remedial discretion, then analysis of property rules and liability rules should
proceed on the assumption that conduct prior to litigation will not be much
affected by the choice of remedy.22
21. See Rose, supra note 7, at 597-610. The choice among remedies makes it possible for a court to
honor entitlements and at the same time to modify an unsatisfactory outcome by limiting claims to
damages. This probably can be done without much impact on the force of the entitlement as a rule of
conduct, because there is a considerable degree of natural "acoustic separation" between rules of entitlement
and remedies: The public is generally aware of property rights and only dimly conscious of the complex
set of remedies by which they might be enforced. The entitlement as announced may even suggest that
encroachment is forbidden (a property rule), rather than permitted on condition that the encroacher pay for
harm caused (a liability rule). But the language of remedies law is sufficiently arcane that ordinary
observers are not likely to appreciate the significance of the remedial distinction. Cf. Dan-Cohen, supra note
15, at 1325-34 (analyzing acoustic separation in criminal law); Emily L. Sherwin, Law and Equity in
Contract Enforcement, 50 MD. L. REv. 253, 300-14 (1991) (discussing acoustic separation in choice of
legal or equitable remedies for enforcement of contracts).
22. Another implication is that the question of form should be taken into account in assessing the
possibility of statutory liability rules, such as pollution taxes that allow industries to pollute and pay. See
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 5, at 750-52 (preferring statutory liability rules, in form of pollution taxes,
to statutory property rules, in form of tradeable pollution rights); Krier & Schwab, supra note 5, at 475-77
(discussing variety of taxes and subsidies that allocate choice of action either to government or to citizens).
Legislatures are more likely, and better situated, to cast remedial rules as rules. When coordination is
important, legislation may be the best approach.
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My object here has been to draw attention to the problem of remedial
discretion and to suggest how it might bear on the analysis of legal
entitlements set forth twenty-five years ago by Calabresi and Melamed. Like
so many others who have written on this subject, I am grateful to Calabresi
and Melamed for their view of "the Cathedral," which has been and continues
to be a wonderful incitement to thought.
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